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Abstract
While East and West Germany reunified into one country in 1990, populist parties have
done better in the former GDR than in the “old lands”. This paper draws on the political science
literature on populism performing better in the absence of robust civil society, as well as the
specific history of the region. I argue that because the GDR had not permitted the development
of robust civil society, when the unexpected economic difficulties of unification arose, they were
compounded by resentment over the necessity of importing more experienced western politicians
to help run western institutions and that the lack of such institutions further hindered
communication between the federal government and the residents of the new states. The strength
of populism in eastern Germany has been an attempt to bridge this gap.
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In the late 2010s, populist movements succeeded across Europe. Marine Le Pen reached
the second round in both the 2017 and 2022 French presidential elections. The United Kingdom
did leave the European Union. Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party solidified power in Hungary, and the
Law and Justice Party came to power in Poland. Germany too saw its share of populism.
However, populism in Germany did not appear equally across the whole country but showed a
strong preference for eastern Germany, for what had once been the German Democratic
Republic. A cursory look through the library of most academic institutions will confirm that the
populist parties of Germany, particularly the AfD, are well-studied, and the psychologies of their
voters extensively discussed by many researchers. Therefore it is not difficult to explain the
existence of these parties. However, less-well understood than the “supply” of populist parties in
Germany is the “demand,” specifically the way it is unevenly distributed throughout the country.
It is not self-evident why both the right and left-wing populists should perform better in what
used to be the GDR.

Research Question and the Argument in Brief

The data (Tables I and II) about the 2017 election clearly shows that
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia -- the states
which used to comprise the German Democratic Republic -- have a markedly higher voter
turnout for the populist parties than do the other states. Why, then, is eastern Germany more
hospitable to populist parties than western Germany? This is the research question of this thesis.
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Table I: 2017 Federal Election Results in Eastern Germany
State

Alternativ für
Deutschland
2017 Federal
Election

Die Linke
2017
Federal
Election

Combined vote
percentage

Brandenburg

20.2

17.2

37.4

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

18.6

17.8

36.4

Saxony

27.0

16.1

43.1

Saxony-Anhalt

19.6

17.8

35.4

Thuringia

22.7

16.9

39.6

Average for Former East
Germany

22.62

17.16

38.38

Source: Tagesschau.de. “BUNDESTAGSWAHL 2017: BUNDESLÄNDER.” Tagesschau,
https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2017-09-24-BT-DE/.
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Table II: 2017 Federal Election Results in western Germany
State

Alternative für

Die Linke 2017

Combined vote

Deutschland 2017

Federal Election

percentage

Federal Election
Baden-Wurttemberg

12.2

6.4

18.6

Bavaria

12.4

6.1

18.5

Berlin

12.0

18.8

30.8

Bremen

10.0

13.5

23.5

Hamburg

7.8

12.2

20.0

Hesse

11.9

8.1

20.0

Lower Saxony

9.1

6.9

16.0

North

9.4

7.5

16.9

Rhineland-Palatinate

11.2

6.8

18.0

Saarland

10.1

12.9

23.0

Schleswig-Holstein

8.2

7.3

15.5

Average for Former

10.23

8.77

19.0

Rhine-Westphalia

West Germany
Source: Tagesschau.de. “BUNDESTAGSWAHL 2017: BUNDESLÄNDER.” Tagesschau,
https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2017-09-24-BT-DE/.
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Excluding Berlin, which was itself partitioned between East and West, the vote share for
the AfD in the eastern states ranged from 18.6% to 27%; the vote share for die Linke in the
eastern states ranged from 16.1% - 17.8%. By contrast, the vote share for the AfD in the western
states ranged from 7.8% - 12.4 %; the vote share for die Linke in the western states ranged from
6.1% - 13.5%. For both the right-populist and left-populist parties, the best results in the western
states were inferior to the lowest ones in the eastern states. The average combined vote count for
the populists is 38% in the eastern states and 19.98% in the western states.
Why would it be the case that support for populist parties in eastern states is almost twice
what it is in western states? I argue that this is the result of multiple factors. The GDR crushed
most civil society in East Germany. During unification, this necessitated the importation of
western institutions and western Germans with experience to run them. This created resentment
of the western Germans for “colonizing” the East. Additionally, the economic dislocations of
unification produced economic insecurity and hardship for many people, increasing the strong
sense of grievance in eastern Germany. This also left many eastern Germans feeling betrayed by,
and resentful of, the western federal government. Finally, it was more difficult for eastern
Germans to communicate these grievances to the federal government because of the lack of
institutional memory of civil society, and the aforementioned western domination of the federal
organizations. Political scientists generally argue that a lack of civil society is a cause for greater
populism as people seek a new style of politics to communicate with the unresponsive
government. Each of these factors, operating in conjunction with one another, led to strong
feelings of dissatisfaction in the eastern states that die Linke and the AfD were able to court for
votes.
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Die Linke and the AfD as Populist Parties

The AfD is the more novel (and more successful) party. Founded in 2013 as a primarily
eurosceptic party, it transitioned to opposition towards immigration, as its primary issue in the
2017 election, in which it saw what -- so far -- has been the peak of its success, as in the 2021
election its share of the vote declined to 10.3%. The AfD is considered a radical right party, and
has consequently had difficulties finding coalition partners even at the state level.
The GDR was governed by the SED, which was created out of a merger of the GDR’s Social
Democrats and Communists. Perhaps unsurprisingly, once Germans in the East began to partake in
competitive elections again, the SED rapidly lost much of its influence and voters. It renamed itself
the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) and continued to compete in elections, pushing a
left-wing agenda and partaking in governments at the state level. In 2005, to broaden its reach and
break out of its regional focus, it allied with the WASG (Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social
Justice). In 2007 the PDS and the WASG formally merged into die Linke1. Die Linke reached its
national height in 2009 with 11% of the national vote. They then returned to their level of about
9% until the 2021 election, when they fell to 4.9%.
Mudde defines populism in general as a “thin-centered ideology” that pits “the people”
against the corrupt elite in a Manichean struggle.2 Populism is better understood as this political
style rather than an ideology; the basic formula that depicts the good senses of the common
people being trampled upon by contemptible elites who refuse to implement simple and obvious
solutions can be filled out by attachment to a given ideology, left or right.3 Populist parties may
furiously oppose one another on economic policy, climate change, abortion or any other issue.4
1

Hough, Dan, and Michael Koß. "Populism Personified Or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party
in 2009 and Beyond." German Politics and Society, vol. 27, no. 2, 2009, pp. 76-91.
2
Hansen, Michael A., and Jonathan Olsen. "Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the Alternative for
Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election." German Politics, vol. 28, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1-19.
3
Hough, Dan, and Michael Koß. "Populism Personified Or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party
in 2009 and Beyond." German Politics and Society, vol. 27, no. 2, 2009, pp. 76-91.
4
Olsen, Jonathan. "The Left Party and the AfD: Populist Competitors in Eastern Germany." German Politics
and Society, vol. 36, no. 1, 2018, pp. 70-83.
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What unites populists is that they generally evince a lack of faith in the democratic political
process and call for greater involvement by “the people.” 5 This sometimes takes the form of
calling for referendums.
The AfD was initially categorized as a eurosceptic party that fought for conservative
economic policies. However, since 2014 it escalated its use of populistic techniques, particularly
anti-immigrant rhetoric after the European debt crisis ended. Olsen cites 2015 as the turning
point wherein the AfD became a right-populist party, emphasizing a distinction between
“natives” and “non-natives.”6 Compared to other parties, the AfD is not particularly
representative of any socio-demographic group of gender, educational level, union membership,
or employment. What unites its supporters is their shared discontent; the AfD mobilized
discontented voters across these groups. The AfD also advocates for referendums as a way to
constrain the government and empower the people.7 By 2017, the AfD was therefore generally
considered to be a standard populist party, as well as a right one, especially in light of its voters'
greater distrust of democracy.8
Die Linke evolved from a combination of PDS and WASG. The PDS was the successor
party to the SED that ruled East Germany. The WASG was more opposed to cooperation with the
establishment SPD than the PDS. After the merger, the WASG leadership -- especially Lafontaine
-- was able steer the nascent die Linke in a more populist direction. The party’s 2011 platform
cast them as oppositional, whereas the PDS had earlier entertained hopes of allying with the SPD
to escape political isolation. In this respect, die Linke has moved into a more populist position.9
Die Linke often advocates for simple solutions to complex problems, in line with rhetoric
advocating for the common sense of the average person. Hough and Koss also link this to a
5

Ibid.
Olsen, Jonathan. "The Left Party and the AfD: Populist Competitors in Eastern Germany." German Politics
and Society, vol. 36, no. 1, 2018, pp. 70-83.
7
Ibid.
8
Hansen, Michael A., and Jonathan Olsen. "Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the Alternative for
Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election." German Politics, vol. 28, no. 1, 2019, pp. 1-19.
9
Patton, David “The Left Party at Six: The PDS–WASG Merger in Comparative Perspective” German Politics,
Vol. 22, No. 3, pp.219-234
6
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rejection of market economics.10 In line with descriptions of populist parties, die Linke has
called for Germany to “dare more democracy” and institute sweeping reforms. Die Linke also
exhibits populist behavior by labeling mainstream German political groups as elitists, lionizing
other leftists, etc. Die Linke’s populist positioning had made them appealing to the large pool of
eastern German protest voters who are discontented with the German status quo. The similarity
between the bases of the two parties can be seen in how the AfD was able to poach away voters
from die Linke in 2017, as well as their shared Russophilia, promotion of referenda, pessimism
about German democracy and hostility to globalization, the European Union, and free trade
agreements.11

Theoretical Background on Civil Society

Civil society is often held to be important in strengthening democracy. Civil society, or
the institutions that bind people together with their fellow citizens, is often held to be a
fundamental ingredient in democracy. It is what creates the potential for larger scale organization
and political discourse between otherwise unlike groups. This is a view most famously
championed by Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone and Making Democracy Work. Putnam argues
that civil societies help to build up social capital by connecting individuals who otherwise would
not be associated and thereby allow for a more robust democracy.12 In chapter 4 of Making
Democracy Work, Putnam examines Italian civil society to compare the efficacy of its political
institutions and the presence of civil society. He finds a strong correlation between the two and
describes it as being so strong that the economic disparities between the regions become
superfluous as independent variables, though he qualifies that economic differences may beget
10

Hough, Dan, and Michael Koß. "Populism Personified Or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party
in 2009 and Beyond." German Politics and Society, vol. 27, no. 2, 2009, pp. 76-91.
11
Olsen, Jonathan. "The Left Party and the AfD: Populist Competitors in Eastern Germany." German Politics
and Society, vol. 36, no. 1, 2018, pp. 70-83.
12
Putnam, Robert. “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America.” Political
Science and Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 664-683
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differences in civil society. Putnam also found, in the same survey, that politicians in areas with
more civil society were more likely to receive questions about policies than they were to receive
requests for patronage. Putnam also finds that the voters of southern Italy, where there are far
more exercises of direct democracy, are less civic and face a more corrupt and populistic
environment than those in northern Italy; he finds that they are more likely to feel cynical about
politics and less likely to believe that ordinary voting will make a difference.13
Indeed, many sources have argued that civil society is a major influence in how
democracies relate to populism once they are established. Civil society has been consistently
observed to vitiate the successes of populist parties by a significant margin.14 Boeri et al. define
populism as “an ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonist groups”, “the pure people” versus the “corrupt elite”, a standard definition. The idea
this entails, that the people speak with one voice, that the people are united in their
righteousness, leaves little room for dissent or alternative points of view, as civil societies may
present.
Boeri et al. infer from this that there will be an inverse correlation between the presence
of civil societies and the strength of populism. They show that although economic recession
generally tended to promote populism, it was not the only determinant factor. Indeed, they found
indications that “membership of a civil society reduces the vote for [a] populist party by roughly
20–30%.”15 They also found that the 2008 financial crisis strengthened rather than weakened this
effect. Building from this, they conclude that civil society has a statistically significant impact on
the probability of support for populist parties because, explicitly echoing Durkheim, a lack of
social connection produces a feeling of disconnect or anomie which then leaves a gap which
populist politics can fill by providing a way of communicating with the state.16

13

Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work. Princeton University Press. 1993. pp. 96-100
Boeri, Tito, Mishra, Prachi, Papageorgiou, Chris, Spilimbergo, Antonio. "Populism and Civil Society."
Economica, vol. 88, no. 352, 2021, pp. 863-895.
15
Ibid, p. 871
16
Ibid
14
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Osborne begins by treating civil society as a feature of liberal democracy. He explains
how theories generally treat them as both a barrier against the indefinite atomization of society
and as “intermediate powers'' between the masses of voters and the liberal democratic state,
insofar as they communicate the wishes of groups of citizens who are not actively and
automatically engaging in partisan or governmental work. Populism relies on a general sense of
alienation from “intermediate powers,” and promises to resolve the populace’s problems by the
creation of a partisan state. In this way, it often comes into conflict with civil society, which
generally serves as a forum and endeavors to act as an impartial mediator between different
factions within society.17 The promises of populist candidates on the other hand generally entail
promising to bring the state into combat against the causes of the people’s problems, marshaling
its powers to provide direct aid. Additionally, once in a position of national power, populists are
generally uninterested in autonomous local institutions, or other buffers as, per Osborne, “The
ideal is to have no representative ‘space’ between the popular will and its
expression—directly—in forms of power.”18
Arato and Cohen begin in a similar vein by defining civil society as possessing three
parameters: publicity, plurality, and privacy. Arato and Cohen also draw a distinction between
political and civil society. Populism is described as being “in but not of” civil society in that
populism benefits in key ways from the freedoms allowed to civil society and much of its
legitimacy comes from democratic norms that emphasize the sovereignty of the people.
However, while populism does sometimes promote greater equality of wealth, social justice, or
the challenge of oligarchy, it also claims to speak on behalf of a unified people (see above).
Moreover, populism has a great capacity to be used in attacking those institutions which make it
and civil society possible in the first place. Arato and Cohen also expand the idea that populism
is best understood not as an ideology with a substantial set of beliefs but rather as a method of
17

Osborne, Thomas. "Civil Society, Populism and Liberalism." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and
Society, vol. 34, no. 2, 2020;2021, pp. 175-190.
18
Ibid.
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discourse. Populism is a discourse that emphasizes a struggle between “the people” and the elite
and manifests a desire to recapture sovereignty from the elite. Populism is thus understood best
as a style of politics onto which ideology can be grafted.19
There is, of some relevance here, also evidence from other post-communist countries that
the relative deprivation of civil society in those countries helps to fuel illiberal attitudes and a
lack of attachment to the norms of democratic politics as usually practiced.20 It should be noted
that Hann explicitly criticizes those who believe that civil society can play the role of an
ersatz-state; nonetheless, the paper outlines a connection between the two. Another aspect to this
may be that Tito et al. argue that there is evidence for the idea in sociology that populism is the
result of a perceived failure on the part of institutions to provide an anchor in the aftermath of
dramatic events. This in turn leads to disaffected persons joining populist movements to regain
their cross-cutting ties with other members of society.21 Consequently, it would be reasonable to
predict that if one area had a history of weakening civil society in a way that another did not,
then, ceteris paribus, the area with the weakened civil society will probably have stronger
populist movements.

19

Arato, Andrew, and Jean L. Cohen. "Civil Society, Populism and Religion." Constellations, vol. 24, no. 3,
2017, pp. 283-295.
20
Ibid.
21
Boeri, Tito, Mishra, Prachi, Papageorgiou, Chris, Spilimbergo, Antonio. "Populism and Civil Society."
Economica, vol. 88, no. 352, 2021, pp. 863-895.
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Chapter II: Explaining the Disproportionately High Support for Populist
Parties in Eastern Germany

Suppression of Civil Society in the Former GDR
In this chapter I will examine the factors that I believe explain the disproportionately high
support for populism in eastern Germany. First I examine suppression of civil society in the
former GDR. Second I look at the economic traumas of unification and the resentment that this
generated in eastern Germany. Third I look at the weakness of civil society in eastern Germany
and the western domination of economic associations and political parties.
After the Second World War and the partition of Germany into Allied Zones of
Occupation, the zone of Soviet Military Occupation (Mecklenburg, Brandenburg,
Sachsen-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia, and what would become known as “East Berlin”) were
formed into the German Democratic Republic. The GDR was a one-party, Communist, state; it is
generally considered to have been a satellite of the Soviet Union. Due to the fact that West Berlin
remained outside of the GDR, it was common for East German dissidents or discontented
persons to flee there and from there to the rest of West Germany until the building of the Berlin
Wall between them in 1961. In 1953, the government forcibly put down demonstrations in Berlin
with Soviet help.
The GDR employed extensive coercive measures, some of which are detailed below.

14

These are necessary to provide context for the development of civil society in Eastern Germany.
The GDR was, unquestionably, a police state; however, it would be incorrect to depict the
non-Stasi population as living in a state of constant terror. It must be understood that the scale of
the Stasi was not common knowledge until after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when many people
were shocked to discover that those closest to them had been agents of the secret police.
However shocking these revelations were, the fact that they were shocking is proof that most
people were unaware of the Stasi’s extent and, consequently, could not have previously resented
the intrusion of which they were unaware.22 Furthermore, the Stasi did not arrest everyone who
dissented. This is not to deny their role or their actions. The fact remains that a great many of the
eastern Germans interviewed on the subject after the unification felt that they had lived
“perfectly normal lives.” Their lives did not constitute some desperate struggle against the
overweening tyranny of an omnipotent state. Nonetheless, despite the eagerness of many
Germans to declare that they lived normal lives under the GDR, it had a chilling effect on public
speech. It was generally understood that one did not discuss politics in public.23
It was also difficult, in the early years, to induce political loyalty in people who were
primarily concerned with how they would rebuild their lives. Many people were also
disillusioned with politics. They had been drawn into one German state politically and ended in
an apocalypse. Now they found themselves in another, and there was a strong desire “not to be
taken in again.” This attitude led to a general cynicism about political matters, and, in later
decades, the rise of “niche societies.” Niche societies served as a way for people to express their
discontent with the political order within the confines imposed on them by the GDR.24 Prior to
the construction of the Berlin Wall, people who were discontented with the GDR could simply
leave for the West. It is therefore not a coincidence that the practice of making veiled critiques of
22

Fulbrook, Mary. Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 379
23
Ibid, p. 381
24
Dochartaigh, Pól Ó. "Introduction: The GDR between Conformism and Subversion." German Life and
Letters, vol. 63, no. 3, 2010, pp. 230-233.
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the regime in public became more common after the Wall was built.25
The GDR did not intend to leave open any private association or enterprise apart from the
state; political groups, churches, civil associations, unions and the press were infiltrated and
pressured, especially throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, Honecker came to power and
adopted a strategy of “consumer socialism,” emphasizing the need to provide people with
comfortable lives under socialism to secure their loyalty. Fiedler and Meyen note that citizens of
the GDR complained less often about the state of the economy and the state-control of the media
during the years of “consumer socialism”, but began to turn against the GDR more strongly in
the 1980s.26
Newspapers were much easier to control than people’s access to than western electronic
media, which far more easily permeated the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, newspapers were under
the control of the state. Perhaps not surprisingly, this led to a growing degree of cynicism about
the intentions of newspapers.27 Writers were also under pressure to conform. In 1979, dissenting
writers found themselves expelled from the Schriftstellerverband, effectively making them
unpublishable in the GDR.28 This initiated a new wave of writers fleeing abroad. The damage of
this was compounded by the fact that, in the years following this, the arms race led to an
increasing desire by Germans in both intellectual circles and peace movements, on both sides of
the Iron Curtain, to unite in opposition to the looming shadow of a conflict that would land
firmly on them. Returning briefly to the idea of increased discourse on nationalism during the
dissolution of the Communist Bloc, it is perhaps possible to retroactively read into this an
increasing degree of shared sense of “German-ness”, which would help explain the drive

25

Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central
Europe. Edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu. Central European University Press, Budapest; New York, 2009.
26
Fiedler, Anke, and Michael Meyen. "The Steering of the Press in the Socialist States of Eastern Europe:
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a Case Study." Cold War History, vol. 15, no. 4, 2015, pp.
449-470.
27
Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989. Oxford University Press, New York,
1995. p. 131
28
Conacher, Jean E., YBP DDA, and JSTOR. Transformation and Education in the Literature of the GDR.
Camden House, Rochester, New York, 2020.
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towards unification following afterwards.
Indeed, the peace movement is one area in which one still reads about sizable civil
society that is not led by the state -- though the state tried to heed Talleyrand’s advice about
joining those movements that cannot be stopped, lest one be compelled to do what they want
and be shown as a puppet. The GDR implemented a policy of universal conscription which
pacifists could avoid only by doing unarmed service under the army’s auspices while facing
discrimination in their job searches. As the peace movement grew and faced pushback after the
1975 Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki, activists began to shelter
under the still semi-autonomous church.29 The general discontent of the intelligentsia helped fuel
increasing disillusion in the students in GDR schools.30 Thus the churches paradoxically were
simultaneously co-opted by the regime with regard to their hierarchy, and yet played a vital role
in fostering resistance to that regime.
One key difference between the FRG and the GDR is the species of unions, for no
democratic, non-partisan unions existed in the GDR after 1949, when the Freier Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) became a compliant instrument of the state and the ruling SED
party. From that point forward, the FDGB assumed the attributes of a “conveyor belt” of ideas
and orders from the Party to the workers. It served to discourage self-initiative and promote a
homogenization of labor. The FDGB was also involved in the administration of healthcare,
social security, and the GDR’s largest travel agency. There were no traditional unions or
workers councils as these were deemed superfluous by the SED, which claimed to already be
promoting the interests of the working class and allowing unionization by virtue of creating a
de facto obligation to join the FDGB. Despite its awareness of growing discontent in the GDR,
the FDGB leadership elected to continue supporting the SED until they fell from power.31
29

Hadjar, Andreas. "Non-Violent Political Protest in East Germany in the 1980s: Protestant Church,
Opposition Groups and the People." German Politics, vol. 12, no. 3, 2003, pp. 107-128.
30
Conacher, Jean E., YBP DDA, and JSTOR (Organization). Transformation and Education in the Literature
of the GDR. Camden House, Rochester, New York, 2020.
31
Michael Fichter. “A House Divided: a View of German Unification as it has Affected Organized Labor.”
German Politics. Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1993. pp. 21-39.
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When it came to the Protestant Church, church and state had an evolving and complicated
relationship to each other. Initially, the GDR had clashed with the Church in East Germany, but
as infiltration increased and opposition to the regime mounted, some modus vivendi became both
more practical and more desirable; therefore, the government began attempting to co-opt it
instead.32 This turn towards cooperation was not a one-sided affair. The Church also came under
pressure and had suffered a steep decline in active membership as children and their parents were
forced to choose -- until 1960 -- between formal initiation of their children into the Church and
Jugendweihe -- a formal “confirmation” into the politics of the GDR and loyalty to it and its
Soviet ally.33 Another round of reconciliation followed the clashes between the Church and the
state over the peace movement, itself partially a response to the introduction of Wehrkunde
(communist military theory mixed with basic soldiering instructions) in schools.34 It is important
to observe that the state ultimately got the better of the Church in both of these confrontations,
with the vast majority of children partaking in Jugendweihe and Wehrkunde remaining in the
curriculum, though the Church was able to claim a sort of victory with greater peace measures.
These aside, the Church too could not stop the state from encroaching on ever more aspects of
society. One must also take into account the degree to which the state sought to blur the lines
between itself and the Church. At least four of the Protestant Landeskirchen were infiltrated by
Stasi informants at the highest levels.35 Many more were generally influenced by or cooperated
with Stasi agents -- for instance Manfred Stolpe, Consistorial President of the eastern Region of
the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg, served as an informer for the Stasi.
Until the dramatic shift back to open confrontation with the churches in 1987, the GDR
generally attempted to infiltrate churches and break up dissident groups. They generally achieved
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short-term results, in terms of quieting opposition. Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (informal
collaborators) would inform their controllers of church affairs and the state would use this
information to formulate its preferred response from the clergy. Buttressing this indirect control
was the direct influence exerted over actual infiltrators and offizielle Mitarbeiter (official
collaborators).36 However, in the long term, this did not prove a viable strategy. It foundered
against the reality that the hierarchy of the Protestant church in Germany was rather less rigid
than had been hoped. It remained generally true that Lutherans of all political persuasions found
it more important to spread Lutheranism than any political message, a fact which was utilized by
the GDR to induce clergy to spread GDR friendly messages and see to it that the State’s point of
view was always represented. But by the same token, this meant that even most collaborating
clergy would not have the suppression of ideas critical to the state as their primary goal.37
While the collaborationist strategy did not augment state control as much as desired,
neither did it preserve the church’s autonomy as much as some clergy hoped. Even aside from
the scandals of Stasi Mitarbeiter which plagued the Church (and most other organizations in the
former GDR), the years of the GDR oversaw a marked decline in the Church’s membership and
social authority. For instance, marriage rates in the former GDR are significantly lower than in
the old FRG.38 Religion of all kinds has declined substantially more in eastern than western
Germany, a fact which was noticed and celebrated by some in the Stasi.39 Whatever may be said
about German Protestant churches as institutions, they did serve as civil societies; their relative
absence manifests in a lower degree of prosocial attitudes.40
In the waning years of the GDR, the church served as the primary incubator of protest
against the regime. Protests in the late GDR took many forms, from leaving anonymous critical
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notes to leaving the SED. At the most perilous to the participants were illegal public
demonstrations, such as the 1988 candle light marches or peace concerts, both of which were
broken up with many arrests. The organization of these protests generally ran through the
church.While the Church was insufficient to ignite revolution, it was the only significant
institution to be autonomous under the GDR and thus was able to serve as a crystallization
point for dissatisfied groups in society to come together and coordinate larger scale protests,
offering them shelter and serving as umbrella organizations.41 None of this negated the
extensive infiltration of the Church or the general preparedness of Church hierarchy to
cooperate with the GDR by blocking prominent dissidents from rising too far or by giving
information. However, the role of the Church in protecting the opposition until it was able to
emerge cannot be disputed.
In some sense, the origin of the GDR required it to remain a closed system. The GDR
was, even after almost half a century, still widely considered an illegitimate state. Created as it
had been from military occupation, the GDR always bore the shadow of being an artificial
state. One of the key dilemmas for reformers was that fully opening the GDR to reform would
almost certainly have resulted in its rapid dismantling and absorption of its constituent states
into the Federal Republic, as indeed happened following the fall of the Berlin Wall.42 Indeed,
even after almost fifty years, the GDR had failed to bind the population to itself in any
meaningful way.43
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Eastern German Economic Transition and its Discontents

Over the course of Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s, the USSR became less willing to
use its troops to prop up other members of the Warsaw Pact against their own populaces. In
1989, the Berlin Wall was torn down and the borders opened. In 1991, the GDR ceased to exist
and its constituent states were absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, the
integration of the eastern states was not a perfectly smooth affair. When the GDR ended, most of
its associated institutions ended with it. Compounding difficulties, the eastern Germans found
themselves in a region of the country which was economically much weaker than the rest. While
there has been extensive modernization, the eastern states remain more dependent on the western
ones than vice versa.44
Economic Transition

After unification, the new states of the Federal Republic suffered from economic
difficulties, which resulted in an unequal distribution of misery. An important step towards
unification was the brief customs union between the two Germanies. Despite the fact that the
exchange rate was designed to be somewhat favorable to the GDR, it was not favorable enough
to avoid serving as a sort of “shock therapy”. The terms of unification were extremely uneven.
The GDR had little to bargain with and was absorbed into the FRG. In terms of economic
turbulence, the GDR resembled most other post-Communist societies, but the absorption into a
larger political unit and national economy was unique and involved the direct transfer of western
economic institutions to East Germany. This transfer resulted in the spread of western experts
and administrators throughout the former GDR.
In addition to the “administrative inequality” this also meant that the East was
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disproportionately vulnerable during eastern Germany’s transfer to the Federal Republic’s
economic system following unification. As unification was planned, the FRG planned to use a
“shock therapy” strategy on East Germany, sought to convert the GDR to the FRG’s economy as
quickly as possible, rather than attempt to prop up the socialist system.45 Accordingly, the two
republics entered into an economic union by means of which the GDR -- previously a closed,
centrally planned economy -- adopted the FRG’s banking system, currency, labor markets, and
other aspects of the economic system. The conversion of currency was pegged at a rate
disproportionately favorable to the Ostmark (East German currency). After a brief period of the
two Germanies existing in economic unity, they politically unified.46
However, with the loss of its Comecon markets and the artificially raised cost of industry,
eastern Germany experienced economic difficulties. Additionally, the FRG’s strategy of
pursuing privatization of formerly public assets with the Treuhandanstalt was not as profitable
as had been hoped.47 As unification proceeded, the labor market in eastern Germany contracted
sharply from 10 million to 7.3 million by 1993. The unemployment rate was disguised by
retraining, early retirement, and short term work.48 Ulrich Blum writes that “about two-thirds of
industrial workers lost their jobs and were redirected into part-time programmes, early
retirement, restructuring and training programmes and unemployment.”49 Large transfers of
money from the western states to eastern states quickly became necessary; in 1993, the western
states transferred 180 billion dollars to the eastern states. The numbers of the self-employed rose
dramatically by 1993 but insufficiently to make up for the collapsed industrial sector that
accounted for 70% of net material product prior to unification but by 1996 had dropped to a
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mere 12% of total eastern effective demand.50

Psychological Impact of Economic Dislocation

Unification was shocking for German society, on both sides of the border. As a result, there
was little proper build up for it psychologically. Because West and East Germany had each been an
economic leader in their respective blocs, many economists and members of the public assumed that
uniting the two would produce a rapidly swelling economic giant. This vision held great appeal to
many in the GDR, who were disillusioned with the utopianism of the Communist Bloc and longed
for more concrete improvements in their day-to-day lives, and who developed far vaster hopes in
this regard than their western counterparts.51
As discussed, unification was economically disruptive for the former GDR. Many
eastern Germans came to believe that they had been lied to by the affluent western Germans.
They felt that their labor was being exploited by those who lived in the western states of the
FRG. Many blamed the Bonn government for deceiving them, proclaiming themselves
“deceived and sold -out”; many argued that they were suffering unjustly because -- through no
other fault than poor geography -- they lived in the former Soviet occupation zone, and
resented the West for not doing more to equalize them vis-a-vis industry.52

Compounding the resentment many in eastern Germany felt over having been deceived
about their future prosperity, frustration bubbled in the new states over the way the “Wessis”
seemed to lord over them. They watched as the Treuhandanstalt sold what had been their
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economic assets to the “Wessis” for seemingly nothing.53 The majority of bankers and lenders to
eastern businesses and citizens come from the western states or abroad, and are denounced as
“robber barons.” Eastern Germans also fulminated against instances where factories in the new
states were purchased by westerners, who then shut them down, mortgaged them, or otherwise
took advantage of their power of the economic fortune of the workers. While this was not a
common experience, neither was it completely anomalous, and it was therefore easy to blame
the general mass of westerners for what happened. Eastern Germans felt like a defeated,
conquered people. Disgruntled easterners saw themselves as the losers of the Cold War, now
annexed and “colonized” by the conquering Wessis.54 These feelings of colonization were
reflected in eastern Germans even calling themselves second class citizens, as Table III shows.
In Table III, over half the population of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia affirm to the
pollster that they feel like they and their fellow eastern Germans are second-class citizens.

Table III: Positive response to the statement ‘Eastern Germans are second-class citizens’

Region

All

AfD voters

Brandenburg

59%

77%

Saxony

66%

78%

Thuringia

70%

86%
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Because West German Chancellor Kohl promised “blossoming landscapes'' (à la the
post-World War Two Wirtschaftswunder) in eastern Germany after unification, it is worth
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whole of Germany. Both eras saw economic growth which served to legitimize the new
state of affairs; however, the former saw the beginning of the economic miracle in West
Germany, whereas the latter was much less remarkable. Moreover, the starting point for the
FRG-as-West-Germany was the near total destruction of society, towards which it would be
very difficult to feel any sort of nostalgia. By contrast, when Germany reunified, the GDR
was absorbed by the FRG. While standards of living in the GDR had been generally lower
than in the FRG, they profoundly exceeded the wreckage of Europe in the “Zero Hour”.
This meant that the residents of the former GDR had something to lose, and felt that they
had lost it.55
More specifically, life under the FRG would be the first experience many citizens of the
former GDR would have with large-scale unemployment, which did not endear them to the new
order. This change was particularly hard to endure because the government of the GDR had been
able to provide near universal employment such that the citizenry of the GDR collectively had
virtually no experience with unemployment. Now those who were unemployed had to endure the
stigma of having failed in the new economy, an economy which had only a 15% unemployment
rate. Now these individuals had to turn to the new (to them) government of the FRG. In
consequence of this mix of economic growth and previous standards of higher employment, the
merger of the Germanies has been legitimized enough that there is general acceptance of
unification, but it is viewed as unfair and embarrassing to the easterners.56

Civil Society Institutions in Eastern Germany: Domination of Western Germans

It was perhaps inevitable that the absorption of the former GDR by the FRG also created
some degree of social upheaval; this was exacerbated by the fact that the GDR had not permitted
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strong social movements, resolving situations instead through state fiat. For instance, while the
GDR afforded stronger legal protections to women in the workplace, education, and the family,
these protections were the result of action by the state, not a response to a robust civic movement.
Consequently, when the GDR ceased to exist, and these protections vanished, there was no civic
force to effectively push for their reinstatement. This is only one example of a larger phenomenon.
The protest movements which brought about unification were the exception and not the rule, as is
demonstrated by the rapidity of their disappearance following the consummation of unification.57
According to Gary Lease, eastern Germany arguably did not experience a
comprehensive revolution during unification. Eastern German Churches served as valves for
discontent but they were not in a position to unilaterally lead to a revolution. Because the
churches in the GDR did not call for opposition, they cannot be described as public focal points
for opposition. Neither can the churches take credit for the outpouring of protest that brought
down the regime, nor can the fact that large numbers of people were demonstrating in favor of
freedom be attributed to the churches, despite their role in incubating those inclined to resist. It
follows therefore, that the opposition to the GDR cannot be understood as a manifestation of
strong civic behavior on the part of the churches. In this respect, Lease supports Offe in arguing
that the unification of Germany did not demonstrate the presence of robust civil society in the
GDR, for powerful movements were generally as quick to dissolve as they were to appear.58
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Kaase observed the results of this combination in 1997. Conceding that the citizens of the
GDR were briefly more democratic in practice than those of the FRG in 1990/1991, he argues
these were anomalous circumstances. After they democratized the GDR -- and thereby set in
motion its abolition -- they did have a brief period of influence. However, the actual processes of
unification, the economic turbulence, the political confusion, etc. caused a diminution of this
influence. Beginning in 1993 and continuing up at least through 1997, researchers have observed
a drift towards illiberalism. In 1996, authoritarianism was measured to be higher for the eastern
states than the western. Accompanying this, researchers found higher levels of anomie. The
increased anomie is a logical consequence of the upheaval that the eastern Germans went through
in those years.59
It is also another demonstration of how many citizens in the eastern states feel a greater
degree of disconnect from their government than do their peers in the western states because, in
addition to old GDR institutions being ineffectual or no longer extant, western ones have failed
to properly take root in the eastern states of the Federal Republic.

Trade Unions and Employer Associations

After die Wende, in early 1990, the FDGB (Freier Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund or Free
German Trade Union Confederation) congress voted for radical reform measures, including the
decentralization of the union and the creation of autonomous local chapters. However, this was
too late to redeem the FDGB in the eyes of the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund or
German Trade Union Confederation), a collection of West German trade unions which sent
advisors to help manage the process of establishing western German unions in eastern Germany
and had no interest in helping the FDGB survive.60
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The DGB had displayed little interest in cooperating with eastern workers prior to
unification. Its representatives did not initially expend much effort attempting to bridge the
divide even once the process of unification had begun until March 1990. At this point it became
clear that unification would be proceeding at a much more rapid pace than had hitherto been
understood. Faced with the possibility of the new states joining with no functional unions at all,
the DGB scrambled to build up democratic unions in the East. They primarily sought to transfer
western institutions over to the East, and did not interact with or seek to incorporate local
initiatives or attempts by the FDGB to remain part of the institutional framework. Attempts at
finding a hybrid form of unionization were rejected. As it became clear that East Germany
would be directly incorporated into the Bundesrepublik and that the Federal Republic’s
institutions would be transferred over, a consensus emerged that failing to mirror unionization
strategies exactly would result in the unions being less powerful. This idea was accepted
amongst eastern workers because they generally had a low opinion of the FDGB, and high
expectations for the DGB.61
The transfer of western unions into eastern Germany was fraught with difficulty. By the
time substantial cooperation between the East and West began, most officials in the FDGB who
were seen as politically compromised had been voted out. Reform advocates in the FDGB
moved into positions of greater power, but they too came from the upper echelons of the FDGB
and were not immediately accountable to its members. The degree of cooperation between old
FDGB and new DGB union officials and administrators varied. However, even in cases where
the DGB officials did not want to cooperate directly with their counterparts, they made working
agreements with their staff to create a functioning system. That said, some DGB officials had an
exceptionally deep mistrust of the old FDGB and sought to recruit from East Germans outside
the FDGB hierarchy and from western Germans. In this, one can see a particularly strong case
of institutional transfer from the West and how it served to strongly undermine what institutions
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had existed in the old GDR. Moreover, the transfer of institutions was not always accompanied
by a transfer of resources. Despite the urging of East Germans, many western unions were
reluctant to transfer funds to them.62
Despite these shortcomings and difficulties, the first decade of unification saw a sharp
rise in the enrollment of East Germans into unions, which generally held prestige. Concurrent
with the rise of western-style unions, however, was the precipitous rise in unemployment in the
new states, as well as the increased social alienation from the loss of the old civic groups
(controlled and state-centric as they were) and the economic chaos unleashed by unification.63
This economic turmoil left the unions little room to maneuver in their pursuit of jobs and
wages equivalent to the West for eastern workers. Their lack of success resulted in many people
resigning their membership and led to a corresponding loss of income from membership fees. So
severe was the situation, that 18.6% of the membership left between 1991 and 1992. This can be
partially attributed to the fact that union membership immediately following unification was
artificially high, because membership in the old FDGB was mandatory. This entailed both that
the membership numbers would be higher than any voluntary organization, but also that the
degree of commitment rooting people in would be weaker. Trade unions were also weakened by
a lack of personnel compared to what they had in the western states.64
Another aspect of Unification which proved difficult to manage was the construction of
institutions for Corporatist Interest Mediation. The Arbeitsamt administers unemployment and
benefits to German workers. However, as the managers of liquidated companies cannot be
members of this association or represent it in any official capacity, the fall of the East German
economy meant that its businesses were decimated and therefore underrepresented. Likewise,
the lawyers who represented the eastern workers in labor courts were often western Germans
with eastern lawyers being relegated to mere junior roles.65
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Political Parties: the Greens and the CDU

Political parties proved no more palatable to easterners, who struggled to deal with the
numerical superiority of westerners, as well as the desire on the part of many activists to reckon
with the past events of repression in the GDR. Some argued that having cooperated with the
GDR authorities should disqualify one from public office or trust. While citizens came together
to disband many Stasi offices, so much of the political and cultural leadership of the GDR had
been compromised by Stasi Mitarbeiter that it was difficult to make a clean start of things.66 For
these and other reasons, the all-German parties remained predominantly western spaces, despite
the Greens’ best efforts to the contrary.
The Greens made an effort to avoid simply absorbing the Green groups in East Germany,
in contrast to other major parties. Instead they sought to negotiate a union of equals. However,
the sharp disparities in organization and political power between the western Greens and the
various small groups in the East meant that, in practice, the results were not significantly
different. It is worth examining this in more detail as a demonstration of how the splintered
nature of East German civil society impacted the nature of politics during the unification.67
The resistance movement to the GDR was ideologically and logistically dispersed. This
was not an accident but a result of GDR policy. Under the GDR it had been impossible for
dissidents to hold public meetings and the constant surveillance hindered communication. This
meant that it was virtually impossible for the dissident movements, including their Green
components, to develop in a centralized or ideologically coherent way. By splintering into small
groups, often meeting in the protective shadow of the Protestant churches, they were able to
survive. Nevertheless, their decentralized nature made it difficult for it to coordinate electorally
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after the fall of the GDR. The relative reluctance of the western Greens to throw their support
behind immediate unification also complicated efforts by some citizens’ groups to cooperate;
ultimately the eastern citizens’ groups stood separately from the Greens in the 1990 elections.
The Greens and their allies were thoroughly unsuccessful; neither the Greens nor Alliance 90
(the Green’s Citizens’ Movement) won any seats. As a result of this electoral catastrophe, the
Greens and Alliance 90 began to prioritize coordination and eventual fusion to maintain
relevance.68
One of the reasons this initial decentralized approach was pursued was that the eastern
Greens were only able to be founded in 1989 and were concerned about preserving their eastern
identity, as well as the political complications attendant to party fusion when there were (in
1990) separate 5% hurdles for the East and West. The fear of western dominance was justified as
there was an overwhelming numerical disparity. Many eastern citizens’ groups like Demokratie
Jetzt und Menschenrechte and Initiative Frieden did not have numerically significant
membership but drew their strength from elite membership. Neues Forum had about 5,000
members and even the political party Alliance 90 had only 2,700. By contrast, the western
Greens had approximately 38,000 members. Moreover, it was not clear how unification could
protect the eastern Interests of its new constituents in the event of a merger. Weighting the party
votes to equalize East and West would require severely underrepresenting the western Greens,
but proportional representation would erase any eastern identity at the party level. However, the
aforementioned pressure made unification of the western and eastern Greens virtually
unavoidable if political relevance was to be maintained.69
Simply put, the refusal of the SED to allow the development of any civil society in the
GDR outside of its control led to a situation where the political groups of eastern Germany could
neither stand on their own - membership in citizens’ groups began to fall rapidly once unification
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had been achieved - nor even merge on even terms with their western counterparts. Though the
Greens took more precautions than other parties, initially guaranteeing the East one fifth of party
conference delegates, four out of nine members of the federal executive, and one of two speakers,
in 1994 it was already feared that the eastern Greens would be left without a party directly
representing them and they would be dominated by the western Germans.56
A contrast to the way the Greens in the West had attempted to link up with a collection of
small groups may be seen in the CDU’s attempts to unite with the “East CDU.” The “East CDU”
was frequently charged with being a defanged mock opposition to the SED that served only to
give it the appearance of legitimacy. Because extensive cooperation - ties with the SED were
only formally cut after the Berlin Wall fell - between the East CDU and the SED had robbed it of
moral authority, some members attempted to reforge the organization. To this end, Lothar de
Maiziere was made chair, and while ideas of pursuing a “third way” between socialism and
capitalism dissolved into support for the western German economic system, the East CDU joined
the briefly democratic GDR’s all party “round table” government to build a bridge to the West.
The eastern CDU was not without its competition. The Demokratischer Aufbruch
competed in Berlin and the South, and the Deutsche Soziale Union had been started by the CSU
to rally conservative foes of the old regime. However, ultimately the power of institutional
inertia prevailed again and the East CDU rapidly emerged as the senior partner of the group.
Despite the fact that secularized Protestant East Germany was not advantageous territory for
them to compete from, the East CDU won over 40% of the vote in March 1990. Thus the east
CDU, in coalition with the Demokratischer Aufbruch and Deutsche Soziale Union as the
Alliance for Germany, made de Maiziere the GDR’s Prime Minister. This set the stage for the
merger of the West CDU and East CDU in October 1990. The CDU did well again in the state
elections, roughly on par with its western performance, and the Demokratischer Aufbruch
merged into the CDU as well. However, much of this success was based in a strong
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dissatisfaction with the SED and a desire to signal a clear break with the past.70
Personnel were to be a major problem for the CDU in the eastern states going forward.
Almost 75% of those in the eastern leadership had joined during the communist era and almost
none had spoken out against the SED. As a result, the CDU in the East drew heavily both from
the Demokratischer Aufbruch, whose relative youth gave them clean records, and increasingly
from western politicians. There were also profound clashes of culture between the East and
West. The western CDU, with its bureaucratized structure, was disdainful of the comparative
disorganization of the eastern CDU, leading to dismissal of eastern ideas and insights.
Worsening the matter, many politicians imported from the West were relatively unimportant
there and began to steer the party in the direction they thought was preferable. There were many
policy differences between the eastern and western sections about European integration,
privatization, and the costs of an internal market. However, the West generally overruled the
East and many western Germans working in the East did not even give up their roles in the
West. This increased the feeling on the part of many eastern Germans that they were being
lorded over and that they would never be able to concentrate on rebuilding the eastern economy,
or deal with the legacy of the Stasi because the West would hold them eternally on a path of
emphasizing low inflation growth and Germany’s new role in Europe. As a result of these
difficulties, the CDU lost members in the East. The CDU in the East found itself trapped
between its eastern needs and the western political apparatus, without a substantial way to push
back and properly course correct.71
Environmental Groups in Eastern Germany

Some institutions created during the GDR, even though they represented popular forces
in GDR society, failed to do well in the transition to the unified Federal Republic. One example
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of this is the Gemeinschaft für Natur und Umweltschutz (GNU). By the 1970s,
environmentalism was becoming an increasingly prominent concern in the GDR. To channel
this energy towards state-friendly ends, the regime created the GNU, an official organ for
advocacy that would keep its members in line. Some activists refused the proffered alliance and
instead sheltered under the umbrella of the churches. Following the democratization and then
dissolution of the Democratic Republic, the GNU still appeared to be an illegitimate
organization to the non-GNU activists and the idea was generally reciprocated. The GNU did
not invite church-affiliated groups to join the founding of the Green Party in Sachsen-Anhalt.
Matters were not helped as the GNU broke into smaller groups such as the Bund für Natur und
Umweltschutz and the Grüne Liga, as these groups suffered from their association with the old
regime.
In the area of environmental activism, however, western institutions were not particularly
successful at moving into the East. The West German BUND Naturschutz and Greenpeace both
reached into the new states, but neither was able to achieve a sizable membership. What
leadership there was in the former GDR has generally been pulled into other political
institutions. As a result of these failures, the former GDR remained an institutional vacuum
which has fueled alienation and a sense of isolation on the part of the many people in the East
who still feel themselves to be fighting for a more ecologically friendly world.72
The early years of unification showed that it was very difficult to transfer western
institutions to the east. The twin difficulties of the CDU and the Greens, despite having had
opposite reactions to the prospect of immediate unification with their counterparts, shows that
the problems were larger than mere tactics. While the economic turbulence further weakened the
efforts of the parties to consolidate their hold, an explanation dealing only with economics does
not account for the persistence of the gap after those first years. Moreover, it would have greater
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difficulty explaining the obstacles confronting the environmentalists, who don’t have the same
crisis of legitimacy during economic crises. The domination of various East German institutions
by western Germans helped weaken the sense of connection between the average German in the
East and their society, but this was itself enabled and prompted by the preexisting organizational
deficiencies in the East.
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Chapter III: Populism since Unification and Conclusion

PDS and AfD

Parties that styled themselves as protest parties and or populist parties targeted voters
who felt unrepresented by the Western parties. The first such party was the PDS. As the PDS
was the successor to the SED, it established itself in the East as a regional party. The PDS
initially campaigned during the 1990s as both a leftist party and a protest party. They attempted
-- relatively successfully -- to drum up support with slogans like “election day is protest day.”
This strategy had some success in eastern Germany where 84% of eastern Germans felt like
second-class citizens and crowds chanted “Wir sind das Volk” outside Treuhand centers.73 As a
leftist party, the PDS stood to benefit from this. The PDS retained much of the SED’s old
organizational infrastructure as well. The PDS reached new electoral heights in the 2004 state
elections as a result of backlash against the Hartz reforms. These reforms attempted to reduce
the scope of the welfare state, in particular by reducing unemployment compensation.74
In the 2005 federal election, the PDS won a full 25% of the eastern vote. Discontent over
the reforms also led to the foundation of the “Alternative for Jobs and Social Justice” Party or
WASG, which did well in western Germany. In 2007 WASG and PDS joined in the founding of
Die Linke, which went on to compete in both West and East, though never quite on even terms.75
The PDS was not the only party in Germany to attract protest votes at this time. On the far
right, the German People’s Union (DVU) did shockingly well in Saxony-Anhalt, winning 12.9%
of the votes in 1998. The DVU primarily drew votes from economically frustrated voters who
supported it -- in many cases -- without regard to ideology. The DVU’s success marked the first
73
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time in the history of reunified Germany that a far-right party had done better in the East than in
the West.76 Disgruntled voters turned to both the left and to the right.
The party that enjoyed the most success in eastern Germany has been the AfD. The AfD
was founded in 2013 to protest against the Eurozone bailouts. It expanded and transformed into a
party which stressed its populist opposition to immigration as well as a deep Euroscepticism.
While the Saxon Frauke Petry was critical in pushing the AfD away from Euroscepticism and
towards hardline immigration policies, the leadership of the AfD remained mostly western
Germans. Despite this, it did better in the East than in the West. This was because its strategy of
courting disgruntled voters engaged in protest voting met with a larger “supply” of potential
voters in the East. Part of this stems from the fact that eastern Germans generally have much
lower degrees of trust in their institutions than western Germans.77 By courting the
non-ideological voters who support populist parties, not due to ideology but due to the style of
populism, the AfD has undermined die Linke’s base of support. This demonstrates the way in
which even a non-regional populist party in Germany finds its base of support gravitating
towards the East.
Thus, the 2017 and 2021 federal elections provide a clarifying coda for this history of
populism. 2017 saw, even as the mainstream parties suffered from diminishing support, the AfD
and die Linke remain firmly anchored in the East. Even as the CDU and SPD faced their
collective nadir, the smaller parties remained regionally divided. The Greens and FDP were
strongest in the West and sought to depict themselves as responsible parties, whereas die Linke
and AfD were strongest in the East and sought to depict themselves as being against the system.
In 2021, however, both populist parties suffered at the polls and die Linke failed to even clear the
five percent threshold. While it is too soon to do a full analysis of why populist parties suffered
in general in 2021, in defeat, die Linke seems to have returned to being a party with a presence
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primarily in the East, like in the days of the PDS.
Thus the history of populist parties in Germany shows how the legacies of the GDR and
unification have shaped the supply of voters in the East. The East has a far deeper reservoir of
support for populist parties than the West, and the AfD and die Linke are currently competing
for this populist vote.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the GDR did not meet with the prosperity that Kohl and so many
others promised. Instead, unemployment struck the eastern states for the first time many could
remember; rich western Germans swept in and bought freshly privatized industries. As the list of
“betrayals” by western industrialists swelled, resentment blossomed against the “Wessis”
responsible for selling out and exploiting the “Ossis,” who sometimes felt that they were the
second-class citizens of a colonized country after losing the Cold War. These twin challenges, the
economic dislocation and the fury it bred, augmented the appeal of populism, which promises to
bypass the ordinary, ineffective channels of communication with the government.
What the problems of labor, party consolidation and environmentalism reviewed in
Chapter II have in common is the supreme difficulty of establishing institutions where none
previously existed in the midst of economic crisis. It would be incorrect to ascribe the disarray
in which these fields fell during unification solely to the economic difficulties. However, it is
clear that, whatever role the economic crisis may have had as a catalyst, there were long-term
structural vulnerabilities in the civic societies of the eastern states caused by the GDR
government’s concerted attempts to control or eliminate civil society in the GDR. This meant
that no organizations not tainted by “collaboration” could be built up in East Germany before
unification and therefore the West found itself attempting to unite with disparate organizations
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that were challenging to merge or cooperate with.
This paper argues that populism has found greater purchase in the former GDR than in
the western states, in significant part because attempts by the GDR to monopolize civil society
resulted in East Germany’s civil society being underdeveloped relative to the West. Once the
GDR was abolished and its states incorporated into the Federal Republic, this underdevelopment
persisted and contributed to the failure of some western institutions to fully transfer to the East.
It also caused them to be unduly dependent on western leadership in eastern areas which
contributed to a general sense of alienation on the part of the eastern electorate.
Thus, because the GDR pursued a policy of a controlled society, it significantly impeded
the development of robust institutions, which in turn meant that attempts to unify them with their
western counterparts necessarily took place on uneven footing. This ensured that, as even the
Greens were forced to concede, any attempt at fusion would result in western dominance,
spreading feelings of alienation. These feelings were strengthened because the adoption of
capitalism entailed a sharp rise in unemployment in the East. This in turn made it even more
difficult for eastern interests to be heard in the western institutions, while simultaneously placing
the eastern Germans in the position of needing the central government more, even as they
seemed less able to be represented in it. This combination of western dominance of key
institutions and economic disruption fostered a sense of anomie and perpetuated the
underdevelopment of civil society in eastern Germany.
This helps explain that the traditional parties did not take root as firmly in the East and
instead the populists began to see success there. The underdevelopment of civil society itself
has contributed to the relative strength of populism in the new states, up through the most recent
federal election.
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